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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
JOSEPH OKAMURA,
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
\ Case No.
11659
TIME INSURANCE COMPANY, (
Defendant-Appellant. }
vs.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF CASE
Action by plaintiff on a group insurance policy
to recover expenses of accidental illness.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Trial court sitting without a jury entered judgment in favor of plaintiff and denied defendant's motion to amend judgment to no cause of action in favor
of defendant.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Reversal of trial court's judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At all times pertinent to this cause of action,
plaintiff and Richard D. Martinez were partners doing business through a corporation known as Garden
1

Art, Inc. The plaintiff and Mr. Martinez were members of the Utah Association of Nurserymen and as
such became insured under a group policy which defendant negotiated with said association. The policy
provided coverage for losses arising from accidental
injury or illness. The group policy was issued to become effective on June 1, 1967 and premiums thereon were to be paid quarterly (EX. P4). The policy
(EX. P5) and the members individual certificate
(EX. P4) by their terms provided that an individual
member's coverage would terminate "on the date any
renewal premium is due, if the required premium
for the Member is not paid."
The initial premium payment for the coverage
of both the plaintiff and Mr. Martinez was paid April
25, 1967 by check of Garden Art, Inc. drawn by Mr.
Martinez (EX. P7). The second quarterly premium
payment for both the plaintiff and Mr. Martinez was
also paid by a Garden Art, Inc. check drawn by Mr.
Martinez on October 5, 1967 (EX. PS), four days
after expiration of the 31 day grace period. The third
quarter premium payment became due December 1,
1967 and the 31 day grace period expired January 1,
1968. Neither the plaintiff nor Mr. Martinez, nor
anyone on their behalf, paid their third quarter premium payment prior to expiration of the 31 day grace
period ( R. 53 & 57). No attempt was ever made to
reinstate Mr. Martinez' coverage (R. 68). Neither the
plaintiff, nor anyone on his behalf, made any request
to defendant company for an extension of the time
2

in which to pay his quarterly premium payment
which became due December 1, 1967 (R. 5 & 20, 58,
72).
On February 6, 1968, plaintiff's wife telephoned
D1·. Harold Lamb regarding plaintiff's ulcer condition ( R. 19 & 23, 60) and on February 8, plaintiff
was submitted to the St. Mark's Hospital with the
chief complaint of "nausea and vomiting and upper
abdominal pain for about 48 hours" (EX. Dll, R.
62). However, plaintiff had experienced the symptoms for which he was hospitalized for as long as a
week prior to February 6, when his wife called Dr.
Lamb ( R. 61, 65) and perhaps as long as two weeks
prior to his hospi taliza ti on ( R. 66). After talking to
Dr. Lamb on February 6, plaintiff's wife on February 7 (EX. D12) mailed a letter (EX. D13) requesting reinstatement of the policy and a check in the
amount of the quarterly premium (EX. D14), both
of which were dated February 5. Defendant's premium accounting department was unable to identify
the account and, therefore, on February 20 wrote
to the plaintiff requesting his group or policy number
(EX. D16). The plaintiff (R. 74) responded by noting his group and individual number on the bottom
of defendant's letter and returning it to the defendant. After identifying the account, defendant by
letter of February 29 (EX. Dl 7) advised plaintiff
that his coverage had lapsed as of December 1, 1967
since the quarterly premium payment due on that
date had not been received during the thirty (31)
<lay grace period and enclosed its check to refund the
3

February 5 payment made by plaintiff's wife. A reinstatement application was also enclosed for plaintiff's use in applying for reinstatement of his coverage if he desired to do so. The reinstatement application was never returned to the defendant.
At no time between the quarterly premium due
date of December 1, 1967 and February 7, 1968
when plaintiff's wife r:aailed the check dated February 5, did anyone advise defendant company of the
symptomatic flare-up of plaintiff's ulcer condition
which necessitated his admission to the hospital on
February 8 (R. 64). Plaintiff's wife made no mention of said condition in her note mailed February 7
(EX. D13) and plaintiff made no mention of his
condition on the note he appended to defendant's
letter of February 20, 1968 (EX. D16).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
PLAINTIFF'S COVERAGE TERMINATED BEFORE LOSS WAS INCURRED.

There is no dispute of the fact that the third
qua1te1· premium payment due on or before Decembe1· 1, 1967 was not paid by that date, or before expiration of the 31 day grace period. Likewise, there
is no dispute of the fact that plaintiff never requested an extension of time in which to pay the third
quarter premium. Therefore, the first question to be
answered is: \Vhat legal effect should be given to
the policy's automatic termination provision, i.e.,
4

"INDIVIDUAL TERMINATION: The inof any Member shall terminate : ( 1)
on the date any renewal premium is due if the
required premium for the Member is not paid;
. . . " ( 'l'he provision contains no notice requirement.)
If the automatic termination provision of a
policy does not specify that notice of cancellation be
given to the insured, then no such notice is required
to effect termination of coverage. In Rogers vs.
Colurnbia National Life Insurance Cornpany, 213
N.W. 757 (Iowa 1927), the quarterly premium was
not paid when due or within the 31 day grace period.
Payment was tendered 22 days after expiration of
the grace period and the company notified the insured
that reinstatement would be necessary and mailed an
application for such. The insured died before receiving the company's letter. The policy provided:
"Upon default in payment of any premium,
... this policy shall lapse, and the company's
only liability shall be such, if any, as is hereinafter provided."
The plaintiff (beneficiary) contended that the termination clause made the policy voidable only, and not
void, and that formal declaration of forfeiture and
notice to the insured should have been given. The
Iowa Supreme Court in sustaining the trial court's
summary judgment in favor of the insurance company stated on this point:
"Declaration and notice were clearly not contemplated by the contract and were not required."
5

In Kehoe vs. Automobile Underwriters, 12 F.
Supp. 14 (D.C.M.D. Penn. 1935), the insured wru
charged with notice of the forfeiture provisons of
his policy which rendered it void for nonpayment of
premiums. In Schick vs. Equitable Life Assuranc1
Society, 59 P.2d 163 (Cal. 1936), the court held that
the policy provision providing for a 31 day grace period during which time the policy should be kept in
force and that the payment of a premium during
the grace period would not maintain the policy in
force beyond the date when the succeeding premium
became payable provided for the policy to terminatf
automatically without any action on the part of tht
company upon nonpayment of the premium on its
due date. And in Long v. Monarch Accident Insurance Company, 30 F.2d 929 (4th Cir. 1929), it ap·
pears that the general rule of long standing is that in
the absence of a special agreement (such as a notice
of cancellation provision) the failure to pay an insur·
ance premium when due ipso facto forfeits the policy
unless there is an amount of money absolutely due the
insured with which the company could pay the pre·
rnium. This case involved the failure of an insured
to pay a quarterly premium on a health and accident
policy and apparently the policy did not contain a
cancellation notice provision. The court in affirming
the directed verdict of the trial court stated:
"We start with the general principal that in
the absence of a special agreement, failure to
pay an insurance premium when due ipso facto
forfeits the policy. (Cases cited)."
6

POINT II.
DEFENDANT DID NOT WAIVE THE AUTOMATIC FORFEITURE PROVISION OF ITS
POLICY.

Since plaintiff does not contend that the third
quarter premium payment was made before expiration of the grace period or that an extension of the
grace period was requested or granted, the only remaining question is: Did defendant waive the automatic forfeiture provision of its policy.
At trial, plaintiff argued that since defendant
had accepted the second quarter premium payment
four days after expiration of the grace period it
waived the automatic forfeiture provision of the
policy with respect to the third quarter premium payment which was mailed 38 days after expiration of
the grace period. The general rule is, however, that
an insurer, at its option, may elect not to declare a
forfeiture by accepting overdue premium payment
and still not waive the requirement that future payments be made when due. Section 32 :293 of Couch
011 Insurance 2d reads as follows:
"An insurer is not obligated to insist upon a
forfeiture when it occurs; rather, it may, at its
option, elect to continue the policy in force.
Furthermore, the right to enforce a forfeiture
for nonpayment of a premium or premium note
is not necessarily waived by mere silence or
inaction on the part of the insurer. Again if,
by the terms of the policy or certificate, the
non-payment of a premium or assessment on
the day specified operates ipso facto to terminate the contract, the failure of the insurer
7

to declare a forfeiture of the policy for nonpayment of the premium or assessuent does not
waive the requirement for prompt payment."
Also, it appears to be a rule of long standing that
the acceptance of an overdue premium while the insured is in good health does not waive forfeiture of
the policy when a subsequent overdue premium payment is made when the insured is in bad health or
after a loss has occurred. Grossman vs. Massachusetts
Beneficial Association, 9 N.E. 753 (Mass. 1887);
Ronald vs. Mutual R. F. Life Association, 30 N.E. 739
(N.Y. 1892); Hutchinson vs. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 335 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1964). As
stated in Thomspon vs. Fidelity Mutual Life Insurance Company, 92 S.W. 1098 (Tenn. 1906):
"A permission to pay a p1:emium after due date
during the life and good health of the insured
is not equivalent to a permission to pay after
his death. It is well settled that a course of
dealing between the parties, under which the
insured accepted overdue premiums when the
insured was in good health, will not give his
representative or himself the right to pay or
tender his premiums after maturity, and he
is in a bad state of health, or had died.
*

*

*

"The reason of this is, there has been an in·
crease in the risk or hazard. An insurer might
be willing to accept an over-due premium and
re-instate an insured when his condition of
health is the same as when the policy was
originally issued, but it can.not be argued from
this that it should be required to remsurance
or reinstate the same person when he was or
8

is in extremis. The course of dealing, if any,
to accept the overdue premiums from a
hve man, not a dead one." (or an ill one).
The foregoing rationale is somewhat moot since
a course of dealing with a man in either a good or
a bad state of health could hardly be established by
an insurer excepting one overdue premium payment.
As stated in Couch on Insurance 2d Section 32 :391:
"Since a few cases or intermittent acts do
not constitute a custom or usage waiving a requirement of prompt payment, it mamfestly
follows that a custom or usage is not established by the mere fact that the policy provision
was waived or ignored on one occasion. Consequently, evidence of the acceptance of one single over-due premium or assessment is insufficient of itself to establish a custom which will
bar the insurer from claiming a forfeiture for
non payment of subsequent premums or assessments. . . ."
In the same treatise at Section 32 :379 are listed
many cases or situations where a custom or usage to
accept late premium payments has been established,
but there is not a single case annotated therein wherein such a custom or usage has been predicated upon
accepting one previous overdue payment.
Also, another fact which precludes a finding of
usage between the parties necessary to predicate an
estoppel based on reliance is that the previous overdue payment was paid by plaintiff's partner, Mr.
Martinez, (R. 53) and consequently, plaintiff would
have had no knowledge of whether it was paid before
9

or after expiration of the grace period. At trial plaintiff testified that he did not even know that the third
quarte1· premium became due on December 1, 1967
( R. 56) although in answer to leading questions propounded at the taking of his deposition, he acknowledged such facts, but it is questionable as to whether
or not he actually knew of the fact at the time the
premium payment was due.
Regarding the change in plaintiff's health, the
record is also clear that there was a substantial
change for the worse after expiration of the grace
period and before the third quarter premium payment was mailed. The grace period expired January
1, 1968 and although the plaintiff contended that he
had suffered from his ulcer syndrome since inception
of the policy, he admitted on cross-examination that
these symptoms had not been severe enough to require
his hospitalization (R. 67) and even during examination by his own counsel, admitted that the symp·
toms for which he was hospitalized had existed for
only one or two weeks prior to his hospitalization
on February 8, 1968, (R. 66), which would
mean that they commenced approximately three
weeks after expiration of the grace period. The de·
fendant was never advised of the change in plaintiff's
health (R. 73-74) and, therefore, could not have voluntarily waived an increase in the risk by accepting
the overdue premium payment mailed February 7,
1968. As stated in 56 Am. Jur., Waiver, Section 2,
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a waiver must be the the intentional relinquishment
of a known right. The defendant could not have intentionally relinquished its right to declare a forfeiture of the policy and avoid an increased risk when
it had no knowledge of the facts which increased the
risk, i.e, plaintiff's nausea, vomiting, and upper abdominal pain which commenced on February 6, fortyeight hours prior to his hospitalization on February
8, 1968. (Ex. D-11, R. 62).
The only other fact on which a waiver could
possibly be predicated is that defendant cashed the
check mailed by plaintiff's wife on February 7, 1966
and held the funds until they were returned by defendant's check on February 29, 1968. However, it
is clear from defendant's letter of February 20, 1968
(Ex. D-16) that it did not accept the check unconditionally, but only on the basis that the account could be
identified and found to be in good standing. As soon
as the letter was received back with plaintiff's notation of the policy number, defendant with its letter
of February 29 (Ex. D-17) refunded the February
7 payment and enclosed an application for reinstatement, which was never returned.
A leading Utah case on this point is BaUard v.
Beneficial Life Insurance Company, 82 Utah 1, 21 P.
2cl 84 7 ( 1933). In that case, the insured's life insurance policy had lapsed for nonpayment of premium,
and, after becoming ill, the insured mailed the overdue premium with interest to the insurance company
shortly before his death. Not knowing of the in11

sured's recent illness and death, the insurance company deposited the check in its account in the usual
course of business, but sent the insured an application
for reinstatement since the policy had lapsed. The
insured died before receiving the reinstatement ap·
plication. After learning of the insured's death, the
insurance company refunded the overdue premium
payment and denied liability under the policy. The
trial court granted judgment for plaintiff and the
insurance company appealed. The Utah Supreme
Court reversed, finding no waiver had taken place.
The court quoted extensively from Cooley's Briefs 011
Insurance, Vol. 5, 2d Ed., which in part stated:
"A waiver of default cannot be predicated on
the acceptance of past due premiums after the
death of the insured, if the insurer is ignorant
of the fact of death ... It may be said that as a
general rule the acceptance of a past due premium on the condition that the insured is in
good health or that he furnish a certificate of
good health, is not such an acceptance as will
waive the forfeiture, such condition not being
copmlied with ... A waiver as to a prior for·
feiture will not arise, where a life or accident
insurer accepts premiums without knowledge
at the time of the insured's death, or serious
illness, or serious injury ... A letter informing
the insured of his right to reinstatement, and
offering to reinstate on compliance with the
conditions of which such right depends, is not
a waiver, the conditions not being complied
with, . . . "
As in the Ballard case, defendant herein did not
know that ulaintiff had become acutely ill on Febru·
i
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ary 6 necessitating his admis3ion to the hospital on
February 8 for an operative procedure when it received the check mailed February 7, since it was not
received until February 9 (Ex. Pl. reverse side). As
soon as the payment was identified as being made on
a policy which had already lapsed, the amount thereof was refunded by the defendant and he was sent
an application for reinstatement, which was never
returned.
CONCLUSION

The policy provided for automatic forfeiture in
the event of nonpayment of quarterly premiums when
due. The December 1, 1967 quarterly premium was
not paid when due or within the 31 day grace period
and no extension of the grace period was requested or
granted. Therefore, plaintiff's coverage terminated
as of December 1, 1967 pursuant to the terms of the
policy. A waiver or estoppel can not be predicated
upon the fact that the insurance company previously
accepted one quarterly premium payment four days
after expiration of the grace period since ( 1) the
payment was made by plaintiff's partner rather than
by plaintiff, (2) a custom or course of dealing cannot
be established by one transaction, and (3) the previous overdue quarterly premium payment made four
days after expiration of the grace period was while
plaintiff was still in relatively good health, whereas
the second overdue premium payment mailed 38 days
after expiration of the grace period was not received
b,v defendant until after plaintiff had been admitted
13

to the hospital for surgery. Likewise, a waiver
cannot be predicated upon the fact that defendant
cashed the overdue premium payment check since it
was accepted conditionally pending identification of
the account and was refunded as soon as it was determined that the policy on which it was paid had lapsed.
WHEREFORE, appellant and defendant below
prays that judgment of the trial court be reversed
and that it be awarded its costs incurred herein.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON & BALDWIN
H. WAYNE WADSWORTH
702 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for AppellantDef endant
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